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II. ELECTION FRAUD IN MEXICO
A Case Study of Elections in the State of
Michoacin on July 12, 1992
CYNTHIA ANDERSON-BARKER*
I. INTRODUCTION: INTEGRITY OF MEXICAN ELECTIONS
Mexico is not a democracy. It is an authoritarian state. For
the past sixty-three years, the Party of the Institutional Revolution
("PRI"), Mexico's hegemonic ruling party, has controlled the Pres-
idency and virtually all the state governorships while holding mock
"democratic" elections for these offices.1 Today in Mexico, in-
dependent movements for democracy are contesting the PRI's con-
trol. Political conflict over election fraud ensues. Human rights
violations escalate. Now, because of increasing economic and
political links between the United States and Mexico, the integrity
and stability of the Mexican political system is suddenly thrust to
the center of public debate in both nations.
Issues concerning democratization in Mexico are of para-
mount concern to citizens and lawmakers in the United States.
Mexico, the United States, and Canada are on the verge of enter-
ing into a trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement, open-
ing new links among their economic, political, and legal systems.
* M.A. (Latin American Studies), University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA),
1990; J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California, 1993. This Article is based on the
author's work as a Research Scholar of the Loyola Law School Institute of Latin American
Legal Studies. Much of the factual information provided in this Article is based on the
author's first-hand knowledge.
1. See generally Kevin J. Middlebrook, Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian
Regime: The Case of Mexico, in TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: LATIN
AMERICA (Guillermo O'Donnell et al. eds., 1986); Bo Anderson & James Cockroft, Con-
trol and Cooptation in Mexican Politics, in LATIN AMERICAN RADICALISM: A DOCUMEN-
TARY REPORT ON LEFT AND NATIONAL MOVEMENTS (Irving Louis Horowitz et al. eds.,
1969); JUDITH ADLER HELLMAN, MEXICO IN CRISIS (2d ed. 1988); ALAN RIDING, DISTANT
NEIGHBORS: A PORTRAIT OF THE MEXICANS (1989); Judith Adler Hellman, Social Control
in Mexico, 12 COMP. POL. 225 (1980); Alejandro Portes, Legislatures Under Authoritarian
Regimes: The Case of Mexico, 5 J. POL. & MIL. Soc'Y 185 (1977); Charles L. Davis &
Kenneth M. Coleman, Electoral Changes in the One-Party Dominant Mexican Polity, 1958-
73: Evidence from Mexico City, 16 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 523 (1982).
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Mexican policy on free trade may be different if there were free
elections in Mexico. United States policy may be different if U.S.
companies, unions, and officials were dealing with Mexican coun-
terparts whose power derived from democratic elections. By deal-
ing, instead, with counterparts whose powers derive from electoral
fraud and "looking the other way" at the lack of democracy in
Mexico, the U.S. Government and business sector silence the
voices of hundreds of thousands of Mexican citizens who are
speaking out for democratic reforms. Furthermore, they ignore
Mexico's violation of an international human right recognized by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the American Decla-
ration and Convention on Human Rights, and the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights-namely, the right to
"free," "fair," "honest," and "genuine" democratic elections.
This Article begins by examining the structures at the national
level that impede democratic reform in Mexico. These structures
are replicated locally in state constitutions and administrative sys-
tems of governance and redress for election irregularities. The Ar-
ticle then turns to the elections held in the State of Michoacdn on
July 12, 1992 for state governor, eighteen local deputies of majority
status, 2 and twelve local deputies of proportional representation. 3
At the time of the election in Michoacdn, 52 of the 113 municipali-
ties in the state were governed by the Party of the Democratic
Revolution ("PRD"), 3 by the National Action Party ("PAN"), 1
by the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution ("PARM"), and
7 were shared co-governments between the PRI and the PRD-a
product of the electoral conflicts in December 1989. 4 This Article
focuses on the key components of the system of electoral fraud
before the election, on election day, and after the votes are cast.
Events occurring in Michoacin are not unique; rather, they exem-
plify how fraud is engineered in state and national elections.
2. "Majority status" deputyships are those elected by a direct majority vote.
3. "Proportional representation" deputyships are those seats which are apportioned
according to the percentage of votes won by each party in a congressional region com-
prised of several states.
4. Mexico: Ruling Party Admits Defeat in Municipal Elections, Inter Press Serv., Dec.
6, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRES File.
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II. THE SUPERSTRUCTURE OF CONTROL BY THE
GovERNMEENT PARTY
A. The Power of the Presidency
There is no true separation of powers nor a system of checks
and balances in the Mexican political system, even though it is a
federal system divided into executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. In a phenomenon called "presidencialismo," the execu-
tive branch monopolizes power through the appointment process
and mechanisms of the state. Presidencialismo is designed to en-
sure presidential and state party control of the political process.
The President rules for one six-year term and nominates his
own successor.5 Article 41 of the Mexican Constitution requires
ratification of Presidential nominees by two-thirds of the Chamber
of Deputies. 6 Additionally, the President, through the government
party apparatus, designates his party's candidates for the state gov-
ernorships and removes them at will.7 He chooses the Supreme
Court Justices and directly controls the Federal Attorney General's
office as well as the heads of numerous administrative agencies be-
neath him. The President is also able to dominate the Congress by
controlling the nomination of his party's Deputies and Senators.
At the national level, prior to the July 1992 elections, 29 of 31 Gov-
ernors, 61 of 64 Senators, and 321 of 500 Deputies (legislators)
were from the PRI.8 As a result of the patronage system and the
debt owed by PRI legislators to the President for their nomination,
"Congress has never failed to pass a bill proposed by the president
and has never overridden a presidential veto or passed a bill op-
posed by the president."9 In fact, according to Javier Livas, legal
counsel to the PAN, the President has never had to veto legislation
because most legislation is initiated by the President. As a result,
the autonomy of lawmakers is curbed. In 1989, President Salinas
initiated more than ninety percent of the legislation considered by
Congress. 10
5. CONSr. art. 83 (Mex.); see also TOM BARRY, RESOURCE CENTER, MExIco: A
COUNTRY GUIDE 17 (1992).
6. CONST. art. 41 (Mex.); see also Andrew Reding & Christopher Whalen, Fragile
Stability: Reform and Repression in Mexico Under Carlos Salinas 1989-91 (World Policy
Institute Mexico Project, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 9, 1991, at 7.
7. BARRY, supra note 5, at 17.
8. Reding & Whalen, supra note 6, at 5.
9. BARRY, supra note 5, at 13.
10. Id.
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The power of the Presidency is also manifest during campaign
periods. In Michoacin, during the preelection period, the Presi-
dent directed the utilization of government resources to influence
voters. As described in a later section on campaign spending, the
President personally initiated the Programa Nacional de
Solidaridad ("PRONASOL"), or "Solidarity" plan, to facilitate the
distribution of goods and services in areas critical for influencing
the outcome of the elections.1
B. The Governability Clause
In addition to the power of the Presidency, the "governability
clause," set forth in Article 54 of the Mexican Constitution, ensures
the ruling party an absolute majority of seats in the Chamber of
Deputies (equivalent to the U.S. House of Representatives) with as
little as 35% of the popular vote. 12 This is accomplished by giving
the party "gaining a simple plurality in the direct vote for Chamber
of Deputies, and only 35% of the vote nationwide, the right to half
the seats plus one in that body." 13 The PRI's control of the electo-
ral process ensures the requisite 35% minimum. Opposing coali-
tions cannot control Congress because the PRI can always outpoll
the parties individually. Andrew Reding of the World Policy Insti-
tute and Christopher Whalen note that, "[iun combination with the
president's absolute control over ruling party legislators, the
'governability clause' reduces the Mexican Congress to little more
than a rubber stamp.' 4
C. Judicial Review
Article 107 of the Mexican Constitution prohibits judicial re-
view of legislation.' 5 "The [Mexican] Supreme Court has never
found a presidential decree, law, or proposed constitutional
amendment to be unconstitutional .... ,"16 An individual may peti-
tion the court for judicial review of his or her particular case when
constitutional rights have been violated. The case cannot, how-
ever, be used as a vehicle to strike down legislation, and it has no
11. See infra part V.D.
12. CONSTr. art. 54 (Mex.).
13. Douglas W. Payne, Mexico: Election Engineering, 22 FREEDOM REv., Nov.-Dec.
1991, at 20, 22.
14. Reding & Whalen, supra note 6, at 4.
15. CONST. art. 107 (Mex.).
16. BARRY, supra note 5, at 18.
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precedential value; an individual in similar circumstances must file
his or her own separate action.
17
D. Federal Control over Election Procedures
Traditionally, the Federal Government has effectively con-
trolled the organization of state elections. This control has been
implemented by forcing local governments to conform their elec-
tion procedures to federal mandates even though state elections
are legally independent and are governed by state election laws.
After widespread charges of fraud in the 1988 Presidential elec-
tions, some reforms were made in the federal election law to allow
for more local influence, but federal control remains. In 1989, the
Federal Electoral Institute ("IFE") was created to organize and
validate national and local election procedures for governor, fed-
eral and state deputies, and municipal presidents. This office com-
piles the list of registered voters and distributes voter registration
cards. Each of the registered political parties has one representa-
tive on the General Council of the IFE. Nonetheless, the President
can appoint six additional "non-partisan" members, giving the PRI
a guaranteed majority. Additionally, the political parties repre-
sented on the IFE are not independent. Through a process of co-
optation and patronage, the PRI has established "satellite parties"
to help ensure majority votes in legislative and administrative bod-
ies such as the State Electoral Commission and the local District
Electoral Commission. 18 Thus, there are only two viable, true op-
position parties in Mexico-the PAN and the PRD.
Finally, the president of the IFE is the PRI Secretary of Gov-
ernment, a cabinet minister also in charge of enforcing domestic
order, federal-state relations, and federal intelligence.1 9 The inde-
pendence of the IFE is thus compromised by government control
of the Institute.
III. HISTORY OF ELECTION INTEGRITY IN MEXICO
Since the PRI was formed in 1929, numerous organized oppo-
sition movements have emerged to challenge the hegemony of the
government party. Yet, it has only been since the mid-1980s that
17. RICHARD D. BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO: A STUDY OF THE AMPARO
SUIT 83-85 (1971).
18. See Anderson & Cockcroft, supra note 1, at 378, 380.
19. C.O.F.I.P.E. art. 74 (Mex.); Reding & Whalen, supra note 6, at 7.
19941
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the PRI has encountered real opposition-the PAN in the northern
states and the PRD in the State of Mexico and several western
states. Numerous reports and studies have been written in the last
ten years documenting the history of fraud committed against the
PAN and the PRD in national and local elections. Available data
include studies on elections in the following states: Mexico (1987,
1991); Jalisco (1988, 1991); Sinaloa (1989); Puebla (1990); San Lufs
Potosi (1990, 1991); Tabasco (1991); Nuevo Le6n (1991); Chihua-
hua (1991); and Morelos (1991).20
IV. BACKGROUND TO ELECTIONS IN MICHOACAN
Before 1988, Michoacdn politics were dominated by the PRI,
although the PAN had a small presence in the state. In July 1988,
the National Democratic Front ("FDN"), a coalition of political
forces and parties led by Cuauhtemoc Cdrdenas, swept the elec-
tions, winning the state and twelve out of thirteen federal electoral
districts. During this year, Cirdenas ran for President and lost due
to manipulation of the vote-count after the election.21 In July 1989,
the PRD won seven seats for local state deputies out of eighteen
legislative districts. Five months later, elections were held for mu-
nicipal presidents and the PRD won 52 municipal presidencies out
of 113. The other seven were shared as cogovernments between
the PRD and the PRI-a compromise reached due to popular mo-
bilizations charging the PRI with fraud. In the federal elections of
August 1991, the PRI won the thirteen federal deputy seats and a
disputed senate seat.22
Numerically, it should be noted that the number of votes cast
for the PRI rose from 127,870 in July 1988, to 506,576 in 1991-an
increase of 395% in the state between the two federal elections. In
July 1989, during the election for local state deputies, the PRI re-
20. See generally NUESTRA PALABRA: EL FRAUDE ELECrORAL DE 1991 Y LA PAR-
TICIPACION CIUDADANA EN LA LUCHA POR LA DEMOCRACIA (Convergencia de Organis-
mos Civiles por la Democracia ed., 1992) [hereinafter NuES-RA PALABRA]; Cuauht6moc
Rivera Godfnez, Michoacdn: Derechos Politicos y Pactos de Civilidad (Centro de Estudios
de la Sociedad Mexicana 1992).
21. Andrew Reding, Mexico Under Salinas: A Facade of Reform, 6 WORLD POL'Y J.
685, 687 (1989).
22. . . . Clean Sweep for PRI, Int'l Rep., Aug. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, IBCINT File.
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ceived 184,289 votes. Five months later, in new elections, it re-
ceived 224,763 votes.23
In contrast, the FDN (Cirdenas' coalition) received 382,787
votes in July 1988. In the August 1991 federal elections, however,
the PRD (the renamed Cirdenas party) received only 291,458
votes. In local elections in July 1989, the PRD received 160,695
votes for its candidates for local deputy, and, in December 1991, it
received 220,589 votes for its candidates for municipal presidents.24
The PRI estimated that its gubernatorial candidate would ob-
tain 700,000 votes in the July 12, 1992, election in Michoacin. 25 In
fact, according to the Government, the PRI received 418,080 votes
(52.7%), compared to the PRD's 289,724 votes (36.5%).26 By offi-
cial count, the PRI actually lost 101,000 votes in less than eleven
months.
All these numbers are based on government figures that have
been disputed by the PRD as fraudulent. The PRD asserts that it
won the July 12, 1992, gubernatorial election, estimating that it re-
ceived 202,570 votes (50%), compared to the PRI's 179,396 votes
(44%).27
What factors account for the precipitous numerical decline in
PRD support after 1988? While opinion polls show that the PRD
may have lost some political support in the state since the Presi-
dential election of 1988,28 the following examination of the July 12,
1992, election reveals other significant factors influencing the offi-
cially-tabulated numerical decline in PRD support.
A. July 1992 Elections in the State of Michoacdn:
Profile of the Candidates
The PRI's candidate for Governor was Eduardo Villasefior
Pefia, ex-president of the National Union of Pig Farmers, ex-mayor
23. Gerardo Galarza, En Michoacdn se Perfila la Lucha Hasta Despues de las Elec-
ciones, PROCESO, June 15, 1992, at 21.
24. Id.
25. PRI Confident of Win in Gubernatorial Race, Notimex Mex. News Serv., June 10,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NOTIMX File.
26. PAN Starts Looking Like an Alternative; Fraud Claims Apart, the PRD Is Clearly
Losing Ground, Latin Am. Wkly. Rep., July 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
LAN File [hereinafter PAN Starts Looking Like an Alternative].
27. Jaime Rivera Veldzquez, Michoacdn en Litigio, NEXOs, Aug. 1992 (Cuaderno), at
3-4.
28. Jaime Rivera Veldzquez, Comentario a una encuesta, NExos, June 1992
(Cuaderno), at 3-4.
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of the town of La Piedad, a former federal deputy for the State of
Michoacin, entrepreneur, and minority stockholder of Banamex,
one of the largest banks in Mexico. The PRD's candidate was Cris-
t6bal Arias Solfs, former state president of the PRI and Secretary
of Government under Cuauht6moc Cirdenas when Cdrdenas was
the PRI Governor of Michoacin from 1980 to 1986. The former
PRI member was also a federal deputy-once for the PRI and
once for the PRD.
The political discourse of the campaign was dominated by is-
sues concerning election fraud and violence. Villasefior focused on
discrediting the PRD by characterizing it as the party of violence.
In addition, according to the PRI, the PRD was responsible for
capital flight and the economic recession. A wealthy entrepreneur,
Villasefior also stated that there is no difference between governing
a country and running a factory.29
Arias focused on respect for the vote and the need to stop
electoral fraud by mobilizing the local citizenry to be involved in
the electoral process. He also asked farm workers to oppose re-
cent agrarian reform measures allowing for the privatization of
common lands ("ejidos"), and stated that the objective of this gov-
ernment initiative was dispossession of the rural peasantry. He re-
peatedly emphasized the need for a peaceful transition to
democracy.
B. The Role of Election Observers
Numerous Mexican organizations were present in Michoacdn
to observe and report on the electoral process, including the Na-
tional Agreement for Democracy ("ACUDE"), the Citizen's
Movement for Democracy ("MCD"), the Convergence of Civil Or-
ganizations for Democracy ("Convergencia"), and the Mexican
Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights.
Prior to the election, MCD's and ACUDE's researchers analyzed
ten aspects of the electoral process and issued a report on June 29,
1992, stating that conditions do not exist for fair elections in Mi-
choacin.30 The report criticized (1) the use of government re-
sources in the campaigns, (2) the structure and function of the
29. Centro de Estudios para un Proyecto Nacional, Michoacdn y Chihuahua: El
Porvenir de la Democracia, ESTE PAlS, July 1992, at 4.
30. Teresa Gurza, La oposici6n, en desventaja: MCD y ACUDE: No se cumplen en
Michoacdn los requisitos para comicios limpios, LA JORNADA, June 30, 1992, at 15.
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electoral bodies and the arbitrary manner in which complaints re-
garding electoral processes prior to election day are handled,
(3) the inaccuracies in the voter registration list and the process of
compiling the list, (4) the manner in which the state and federal
electoral laws ensure that the PRI retains a majority in legislative
bodies at the state and federal level, and, particularly (5) how the
government party controls state electoral bodies.31 The report ad-
ditionally criticized the use of the government Solidarity program
as a means to "buy" votes for the PRI.32
Convergencia is composed of 150 non-partisan, non-govern-
mental associations and works in twenty-two states in Mexico.
One goal of the organization is to strengthen the formation of a
new electoral actor, a citizen who demands clean elections, fair
rules, and standardized conditions for the conduct of elections. To
that end, the organization conducts workshops on local election
law and trains citizens to be election observers. Convergencia also
issues reports based on election observations, utilizing the data col-
lected by local observers and drawing on the resources of academ-
ics and lawyers who analyze election processes prior to the
election. On July 10, 1992, Convergencia issued a report based on a
three-month study conducted prior to the election in Michoacdn,
stating: "[T]he electoral process in Michoacin has so many irregu-
larities that we do not consider the universal criteria of cleanness,
freedom and impartiality to be present."33 Convergencia also or-
ganized 450 Mexican observers to be present at the polling places
in thirty municipalities on election day. Thirty-five percent of that
number were from Michoacin and 65% were from other states in
Mexico. The observers interviewed voters at 200 polling places.
Their findings are noted in the section of this Article on election-
day fraud. 34
Finally, observers from outside Mexico were present for the
election in Michoacin. In response to a request by the MCD, the
ACUDE, and Convergencia, a group of fourteen individuals from
31. El Movimiento Ciudadano por la Democracia & Acuerdo Nacional para la
Democracia, Dictamen sobre las condiciones de competencia efectiva en el proceso politico
de Michoacdn en el mes de julio de 1992, 1-9 (June 29, 1992) [hereinafter Dictamen].
32. Id.
33. Convergencia de Organismos Civiles Por La Democracia, Informe Preliminar de
la Observaci6n del Proceso Electoral Previo a La Jornada Electoral 2 (July 10, 1992) (trans-
lation by author).
34. See infra part VI.
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California, Washington, D.C., and Arizona travelled to Michoacin
to witness the national observation process on election day and
during the preceding week. The group was composed of writers,
academics, professionals, and students. Individual members of the
group have been involved in analyzing democratic processes and
election issues in both the United States and Mexico. The author
of this Article participated in the delegation, in addition to con-
ducting interviews and research in Michoacin. The delegation met
with representatives and leaders of the PRI, the PAN, the PRD,
and civic organizations, as well as members of the national and in-
ternational press and lawyers and academics in both Michoacin
and Mexico City.
Additionally, representatives from the Council of Freely-
Elected Heads of Government, led by Dr. Robert A. Pastor of the
Carter Center of Emory University, were present in Mexico to wit-
ness the elections in both Michoacin and Chihuahua. Their man-
date was to witness the observation of the elections by the eight
Mexican observer groups. In a report released the day after the
election, the delegation noted the impartiality and dedication of
the national observers at the polling places, when it stated:
The local observer groups are new and have flaws, but they are
dedicated and could play a vital role in the political process if
they are given the kind of support and access to the electoral
process that is essential to be effective and to demonstrate their
impartiality. Such a role can only succeed as civil society deep-
ens, and the political parties increase their capacity to make the
system accountable. 35
The delegation, however, expressed grave concern over statements
made before the election by Mexican observer groups that condi-
tions did not exist for free and fair elections. In particular, the re-
port criticized the conclusion that the voter registration list was
flawed by 30 to 37% in both Michoacin and Chihuahua. The dele-
gation also acknowledged the problems raised by the Mexican ob-
server groups-use of state funds by the governing party,
disproportionate spending between the parties, inequitable access
to the media, and partiality of election officials. The delegation
35. Report of the Team Sent by the Council of Freely-Elected Heads of Government To
Witness the Observation of the Elections in Michoacdn and Chihuahua, Mexico (The Carter
Center of Emory University, Latin American & Caribbean Program, Atlanta, Georgia),
July 13, 1992, at 4.
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noted, however, that meaningful elections can occur without full
resolution of these problems.
Mexican national observers from outside the State of Michoa-
can, as well as foreign election observers, were not welcomed by
the Government. In a press release issued on July 10, 1992, the
army condemned the presence of "people foreign to the state be-
longing to diverse political parties with the supposed goal of vigi-
lance and support of the electoral process," asserting that the
Mexican observers could cause conflicts among citizens that con-
gregate at polling places to vote.36 Additionally, the Government
and all the registered political parties, except the PRD, took a for-
mal position against the presence of foreign election observers in
Michoacin on election day.
The PRI argued that the presence of observers violates the
sovereignty of Mexico. The PRD argued that national and interna-
tional observers were necessary to observe and report on the integ-
rity of the electoral process to the local and international
community. As the debate raged on in the Michoacin press, the
author of this Article and Craig Cardon, a student of Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles, California, were ordered to leave a public
meeting of the State Electoral Commission while they were gather-
ing research on how complaints regarding election irregularities
were resolved by the Commission. Subsequently, on the day of the
election, the State Electoral Commission passed a resolution re-
questing the Federal Government to order the two students de-
ported for allegedly telling voters how to vote at the polling places
on election day. The State Electoral Commission charges were
completely false. The lack of foundation to the charges and the
Commission's vote to expel the students based on false charges
demonstrate how the Commission acts as a rubber stamp for the
Government's political interest.
V. PREELECTION MANIPULATIONS
A. Intimidation of Opponents
During the campaigns, both the PRD and the PRI leveled
charges of intimidation of opponents through political propaganda
36. Jaime Lopez Martfnez, Gente Ajena al Estado, Podria Ocasionar Conflictos: SDN,
LA Voz DE MICHOACAN, July 11, 1992, at Al; Pascal Beltran del Rio & Francisco Castella-
nos, Las elecciones en Michoacdn, Encaminadas Ineludiblemente Hacia el Conflicto,
PROCESO, July 13, 1992, at 16 (translation by author).
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and campaign speeches. PRD candidate Arias asserted that the
PRI's strategy was to delegitimize the PRD by characterizing the
PRD as the party of violence responsible for the political conflicts
arising out of prior elections. In one speech, PRI candidate Vil-
lasefior asserted: "Political violence has plunged MichoacAn in mis-
ery. I bring peace to the state. With peace comes investment and
with investment comes progress." 37 The PRI formed a civilian
group called the Committee for the Defense of Stability and Social
Peace. The group's leader, Leonardo Pedraza Miranda, was a
member of the PRI gubernatorial candidate's campaign commit-
tee. The purpose of the civilian group was to prevent violence on
election day.38
Political conflict over elections is a reality in Mexico. It is fu-
eled by widespread government fraud and manipulation of the
political process. The PRD claims that, since 1988, at least 110 ac-
tivists and leaders of the PRD have been assassinated in politically
motivated killings, and approximately 35% of that number died in
acts of repression while they were protesting electoral fraud. The
majority of those killed came from the States of Guerrero, Michoa-
cAn, Oaxaca, and Puebla-states where the PRD has the greatest
support.39
In response to the PRI's charges of violence during the pree-
lectoral period, PRD candidate Arias asserted that the PRD was
not renouncing its right to peacefully mobilize people against
fraud. Yet, he expressed concern that the climate of fear would
affect support for the PRD on election day. "Peace only can affect
them [the PRI] because they know that if there is confidence in
voting, without risks, people will vote overwhelmingly for us. On
the other hand, if there is fear many people will prefer to stay
home."4o
The PAN candidate for Governor, Fernando Estrada Samano,
had a different analysis of what constitutes violence in the electoral
process. He asserted that "the only formula for real peace is an
absence of fraud; the government generates violence ... when its
37. Pascal Beltran del Rio & Francisco Castellanos, Encabezados por el Candidato
Villasefior, los Priistas Michoacanos Impulsan el Temor a la Violencia, PROCEso, June 29,
1992, at 16 (translation by author).
38. Id.
39. COMISION DE DEREcHos HUMANOS PARTIDO DE LA REVOLUCION DEMOCRAT-
ICA, TRES ANOS DE REPRESION POLITICA EN MExico 4 (1991).
40. Beltran del Rio & Castellanos, supra note 37, at 16 (translation by author).
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candidate brings people to a meeting and wants to buy them with a
kilo of tortillas."
41
The presence of the military also charged the electoral atmos-
phere. Prior to the elections, three PRI officials-the Secretary of
Government, the leader of the State Legislature, and the President
of the State Electoral Commission-spoke of the need to guaran-
tee order. Later, officials in the state government asked for the
presence of the military at the voting booths. Consequently, dur-
ing the few days before the election, as well as on election day, the
military was visibly present throughout the state.
B. Campaign Spending
The PRI has been criticized by both the PAN and the PRD for
using the institutional resources of the state to influence potential
voters. This familiar technique is unfair and wrong whenever it is
practiced, including in the United States, but in Mexico, it is car-
ried to extremes. Resources that should be distributed equitably
are, instead, channeled by the Federal Government into key states
and municipalities to influence votes. In addition to wasting re-
sources, minority parties are put at a competitive disadvantage be-
cause they cannot offer the same goods and services to voters.
Citizens are put at a disadvantage by what is, in essence, bribery
for their votes. Dr. Arnaldo C6rdova, advisor to the PRD's guber-
natorial candidate in MichoacAn and author of numerous texts on
politics in Mexico, states: "The PRI is not a party, it's the govern-
ment. It does not compete under equal conditions with the other
political parties, at least not here. '4 2
Resources are channeled into the PRI campaign through dif-
ferent mechanisms: the public financing provisions of the federal
election code, the Government's public works Solidarity program,
and private sector donations.
C. Public Financing of Political Campaigns
Public financing of political parties is established by Article 49
of the Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures
41. Id.
42. Pascal Beltran del Rio, La Pugna Entre Salinas y Cdrdenas Diluy6 la Posibilidad
de Triunfo de Arias: Arnaldo C6rdova, Pnociso, July 20, 1992, at 15 (translation by
author).
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("COFIPE") 43 and Article 39 of the State Election Law." The
Federal Government budgeted approximately 1 million U.S. dol-
lars for campaign-spending nationwide from a total public-financ-
ing budget of approximately 20 million U.S. dollars. At the
national level, there are ten registered parties-each was to receive
1 million U.S. dollars. The balance of the 20 million U.S. dollars
(10 million U.S. dollars) is dispensed to the ten parties in propor-
tion to the percentage of votes received in the most recent federal
election. In fact, 1991 total public financing for all the political par-
ties rose to 36.3 million U.S. dollars for the ten registered parties.4 5
Through election engineering, the PRI can monopolize the bulk of
public funds for elections.
The political parties are not legally required to account for
funds received from other sources. One political analyst recom-
mends a comprehensive audit of all campaign expenditures by an
independent electoral body. 6 This could help determine whether
public funds are diverted into the campaigns beyond the author-
ized amounts. There are no exact figures on actual campaign ex-
penditures because there are no reporting requirements for funds
from non-public sources. According to Dr. Alfonso Millan, cam-
paign consultant for the PRD, the PRD will spend 5 million U.S.
dollars for the state election in Michoacin, while the PRI will
spend 50 million U.S. dollars. 47 Gubernatorial candidate Villase-
fior denied that the PRI was spending that amount. According to
Villasefior, the PRI has only spent between 2 and 2.3 million U.S.
dollars in the state in addition to campaign funds received from
other sources. Villasefior stated that his thirteen finance commit-
tees have raised about 2 million U.S. dollars.48
D. Use of State Resources To Influence Voters
Another source of support for political campaigns is govern-
ment spending programs. President Salinas de Gotari has amassed
more economic and political control than any of the last six Presi-
43. C.O.F.I.P.E. art 49 (Mex.).
44. LEY ELECrORAL DEL ESTADO DE MICHOACAN DE OCAMPO art. 39 (Mex.).
45. IFE, Perrogativas del Registro de Partidos, NExos, Jan. 1992, at 74.
46. Payne, supra note 13, at 22.
47. Interview with Dr. Alfonso Millan, Campaign Consultant for the PRD, in More-
lia, Michoacun (July 1, 1992).
48. Interview with Eduardo Villasefior Pefia, PRI candidate for Governor, in Morelia,
Michoac,.n (July 3, 1992) (conducted by Lisa Bransten).
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dents by creating programs to take spending out of the hands of
local government and by giving states less control over their own
budgets. One way he has done this is by creating a huge govern-
ment spending program called PRONASOL. One of the program
objectives is to diffuse social discontent through selective subsidies
and to undermine the strength of left-wing opposition movements
by establishing ties with and commitments to the government-
sponsored Solidarity movements.49 For example, over a two-year
period preparing for mayoral and legislature elections in the State
of Mexico in 1990, "The government pumped 92 million U.S. dol-
lars into Mexico state through its Solidarity public works program,
which was closely identified with the PRI. °50 Furthermore, "[T]wo
weeks before the midterm elections of August 1991, Salinas toured
Mexico and personally handed out in less than ten days as many
land titles as distributed by the Mexican government over the past
fourteen years."51
Nationwide the Federal Government controls about 85% of
public funds, leaving states less than 12% and municipal govern-
ments about 3%. Most municipalities get 80% of their revenues
from Federal and state governments and only 20% from local
sources.52 Nationally, PRONASOL operated with a budget of 1.7
billion U.S. dollars in 1991-2.2% of total budgeted federal gov-
ernment spending for that year.53 Local governments need federal
programs like PRONASOL to bring resources into their communi-
ties. Yet, local communities may be excluded from participating in
the programs when opposition party mayors run the municipalities.
Critics of the federally-funded Solidarity program in Michoa-
cin focus on how the Government decides which programs to fund
and the way the programs are used to promote the PRI. Obvi-
ously, one function of a government is the distribution of goods
and services. Every incumbent naturally derives political support
and media benefits from such projects. The issue is whether the
government-sponsored program is designed specifically to influ-
ence voters in key contested areas, denying other states or munici-
49. DENISE DRESSER, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO, NEOPOPULIST SOLU-
TIONS TO NEOLIBERAL PROBLEMS: MExIco's NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM 2 (1991).
50. Marjorie Miller, Democracy Is the Biggest Loser in Mexico State Election, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1992, at A5.
51. DRESSER, supra note 49, at 24.
52. BARRY, supra note 5, at 17.
53. DRESSER, supra note 49, at 5.
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palities their fair share of the pie, and whether these resources
actually are appropriated by the PRI to promote the party. Addi-
tional concerns are cited in a recent report published by the Center
for U.S. Mexican Studies at the University of California at San Di-
ego. Denise Dresser notes that
what is particularly wrong with PRONASOL is that it is run out
of the president's private pocket, its beneficiaries are selected
on personalistic and partisan political grounds, and, most funda-
mentally, it is immune from any democratic means of control or
accountability. As a result, PRONASOL may strengthen insti-
tutions and practices-such as presidentialism and unfair com-
petition among parties-that constitute the main obstacles to
political change in Mexico.54
The Federal Government receives requests and distributes
PRONASOL resources through local Solidarity committees com-
posed primarily of PRI activists. In some cases, requests are re-
ceived directly from municipal governments. Salinas believes,
however, that it is often necessary to bypass municipal govern-
ments to put control of the program into the hands of the less polit-
ically-corrupt and more efficient Solidarity committees.
Conversely, the PAN believes the bulk of public funds should be
distributed through the local municipalities because it is the central
Government that is corrupt and inefficient.55
The PRD asserts that because states and municipalities have
less control over resources, municipalities with PRD mayors re-
ceive discriminatory treatment by the Federal Government; pro-
posed projects are not funded and the input of PRD municipal
governments is not solicited in the formulation of Solidarity
projects. In Morelia, the capital of Michoacin, the PRD mayor,
Samuel Maldonado, stated that his administration has been ham-
pered by the lack of promised federal resources and that his office
is completely bypassed in the development and delivery of social
service projects.56 Public works projects he has proposed have not
been considered even though the State of Michoacin is the largest
recipient of PRONASOL funds for Solidarity projects.
54. Id. at 3.
55. FERNANDO ESTRADA, PARTIDO AcrIvo NACIONAL, SOLUCIONES MICHOACAN
92, 10 (1992).
56. Pascal Beltran del Rio, En Su Improvisado Despacho Callejero, el Alcalde de
Morelia Denuncio la "legalidad" Electoral, PRocEso, July 13, 1992, at 17.
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An additional criticism is the manner in which government
programs are used to generate support for the PRI and the way
people are excluded from the Solidarity programs for not support-
ing the PRI. For example, in the town of Realito, Michoacin, the
PRONASOL milk distribution program was used to distribute PRI
propaganda and to organize meetings for the party. The milk came
in containers with the portrait of the PRI gubernatorial candidate
and, when people came to get their allotment of milk, they were
invited to the campaign events of the candidate. 57 In the town of
Colonia Ampliaci6n Primo Tapia, one individual working with the
local Solidarity committee complained that PRI activists advised
individuals in the group to affiliate with the PRI. He told PRI ac-
tivists that a political party affiliation was not necessary to solve the
town's problems. There was no response to the group's subsequent
petitions for Solidarity projects. In fact, the construction of a milk
distribution project, which had already been authorized, was
canceled.58
The huge expenditure of government funds for Solidarity pro-
grams has garnered support for the PRI in Michoacin, and "in this
election year the coffers of the National Program of Solidarity have
opened wide for Michoacin as in no other state."59 From Decem-
ber 1988 (the year Cirdenas ran for President against Salinas and
lost the election because of fraud) to the end of 1991, federal
spending increased by 800% in the state. In 1989, PRONASOL
spent 14,500,000 U.S. dollars; in 1990, 53,348,000 U.S. dollars; and
in 1991, 144,451,000 U.S. dollars. In 1992, an election year, a total
of 295,333,000 U.S. dollars was allocated for Michoacin.60 Thus, in
four years, approximately 507,632,000 U.S. dollars will have been
spent on federal public works projects in Michoacin.
As spending in the state increased after the 1988 elections, the
PRD apparently lost voters. According to official figures, in 1988,
the Cdirdenas coalition received 64% of the vote in Michoacin,
compared to only 23% for the PRI. In the 1991 congressional elec-
tions, however, the PRD received only 31% of the vote to the
PRI's 54%. President Salinas justified the massive increase in pub-
57. Jesus Cantu, Solidaridad, Ademas de Electorero, se Manejo en Michoacdn Coreci-
tivamente, PROCESO, July 13, 1992, at 14.
58. Id.
59. Carlos Acosta, Con su Apresuramiento del Lunes 13, Salinas Culmin6 su Interven-
ci6n en Chihuahua y Michoacdn, PROCESO, July 20, 1992, at 12 (translation by author).
60. Id.
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lic spending by stating that Michoacin needed the solidarity and
support of all Mexicans. Other analysts assert that the PRI is in-
vesting such huge amounts in the state because the PRI is looking
ahead to the 1994 election and cannot afford to lose the Governor-
ship to a PRD candidate. In order to stop the momentum of the
PRD, the PRI must defeat the PRD in the home state of its polit-
ical leader.
According to official (but disputed) figures, the PRI won the
election in Michoacin by 128,356 votes. It is probable that the or-
ganized network of more than 10,000 PRI-identified Solidarity
committees, incorporating about 80% of the Michoacin population
into PRONASOL programs, had some impact on voting patterns.
Funds were targeted to key areas, as evidenced by the fact that, in
1991, more than 60% of the money invested in Michoacin was des-
tined for the twenty-five municipalities where the PRI received
60% of the vote in the August 1991 elections. 61
It is difficult to determine how government funds are commin-
gled with campaign expenditures. During the campaign in Michoa-
can, the PRI gubernatorial candidate was accompanied by the
national leader of the party, Genaro Borrego, who distributed
thousands of PRI promotional goods with PRI logos: raincoats,
shirts, pens, and notebooks. In one town that is strongly support-
ive of the PRD, Villasefior actually handed out cash to potential
voters.62 Villasefior denied that he was trying to buy or corrupt
voters, although he acknowledged that he had distributed money,
resources, and materials for projects on which people have solic-
ited his help. "If we have the resources, why not-the help is not
conditioned on their vote and the vote is secret." 63
Nonetheless, use of government institutions to promote the
government party is easier to detect. For example, a study by Con-
vergencia notes that the IFE uses information gathered during the
registration process to identify PRI supporters.64 With this infor-
mation, the PRI organizes vote promoters to mobilize PRI voters
before the election.
The timing of the release of government resources is also re-
vealing. For example, in June 1992, one month before the election,
61. Cantu, supra note 57, at 14.
62. Samuel MAynez Puente, Incredulidad, PRocESo, July 20, 1992, at 34.
63. Galarza, supra note 23, at 20 (translation by author).
64. See generally NUESTRA PALABRA, supra note 20.
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the Government announced a new government credit program to
benefit marginal landholders called "Credito a la Palabra" (an un-
secured loan program). The state said it would allocate 34 million
U.S. dollars in credits to benefit 100,000 agricultural workers who
previously had not been able to get credits from Banrural and
FIRA (a government trust fund).
65
E. Private Sector Resources
In Michoacin, the PRI also had a competitive advantage when
raising funds from the private sector. While the PRD is identified
as the party of the poor, the PRI has substantial financial support
from the middle and upper classes. Friends of PRI candidates con-
tribute goods, services, and actually build infrastructure in impov-
erished communities. Villasefior acknowledged that he received
contributions from his entrepreneurial friends. A friend in Mexico
lent him a helicopter and a pilot for the campaign tour. His friends
on the campaign finance committee gave 2 million U.S. dollars,
some of it in resources. In Uruapan, a city in Michoacin, the PRI
organized a hospitality event for mothers, where the PRI distrib-
uted stoves, refrigerators, irons, juicers, and other housewares
donated by a local businessman.
In conclusion, the massive use of state resources and public
financing, combined with private sector spending, all gave the gov-
ernment party a greater resource-base to promote the PRI vote.
On the surface, such patronage by a government in power may
seem no different from practices in the United States, where, for
example, then-President Bush, facing an election, sold military jets
to a foreign government to save a defense plant in St. Louis, Mis-
souri.66 But in Mexico, in contrast to the United States, the PRI
has had a monopoly on the exercise of political power for the last
sixty-four years. As in the sphere of economics, such a monopoly
creates distortions and corruption of the counterbalancing correc-
tive forces-forces that must be allowed to operate for a democ-
racy to exist. Even with the massive expenditures by the PRI,
however, by official figures, the PRI candidate won by only a 16%
margin, 67 indicating that, despite PRI's investment in the state, the
65. "Credito a la Palabra" a Cien Mil Productores Michoacanos, LA Voz DE MICHOA-
CAN, June 24, 1991, at 32A.
66. Simon Tisdall, Bush Approves Sale of Fighter Jets to Saudis To Protect Jobs,
GUARDIAN, Sept. 13, 1992, at 13.
67. PAN Starts Looking Like an Alternative, supra note 26.
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PRD maintained about the same number of votes received in the
1991 elections. Nonetheless, it should be noted that, between 1988,
when the PRONASOL program started, and 1992, voting levels for
the PRD have decreased markedly.
F. Manipulation of the Voter Registration List
In Michoacin, the registration period for new voters and those
with expired credentials was April 20 to April 30.68 Representa-
tives of the IFE go from house to house, taking the requisite data
from new eligible voters, including fingerprints and signatures. If
the eligible voter is not home, the information is not taken, and it is
up to the voter to go to a predesignated location to register to vote.
In past elections, it has been shown that, in areas with high
concentrations of opposition voters, the IFE visited some homes at
hours inconvenient for residents (work hours); thus, registration
ended up being higher in areas with PRI supporters and lower in
areas with opposition voters. For example, in a study of the voting
sections in the 1991 Chihuahua elections, Convergencia found that
only 20.8% of the population in a voting district known to support
the PRI were not registered at home, while 31.8% of the popula-
tion known to support PAN were not registered at home.69
During the same 1991 election period, Convergencia surveyed
a district of known PAN supporters. The IFE had estimated that
there were 214,409 citizens in District IV; by contrast, Con-
vergencia found 285,155 voters. Thus, 70,000 more people existed
than were surveyed and registered by the IFE.70
A study done prior to the July 1992 election in Michoacdn by
Cuauhtrmoc Rivera of the Center for the Study of Mexican Soci-
ety found that, statewide, 112,000 eligible voters had been excluded
from the voting list.71
Dr. Alfonso Millan, Electoral Coordinator of the National Ex-
ecutive Committee of the PRD, and Antonio Santos, PRD Secre-
tary for the Defense of the Vote, assert that the voting list utilized
68. Calendario del Proceso Electoral en el Estado de Michoacdn 1 (1992) (calendar of
Michoacdn's electoral process, published by the State Electoral Commission, on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal).
69. Hugo Amada Mireles et al., Como se hizo el Fraude en las Elecciones Federales de
1991: El Caso de Ciudad Judrez, Chihuahua, in NUESTRA PALABRA, supra note 20, at 115,
118.
70. See id. at 126-27.
71. Puente, supra note 62, at 34.
[Vol. 16:307
Mexican Election Law Symposium
in December 1989 and 1991 has been reduced in number by
212,000 citizens. They assert that these decreases are the result of
selective shaving. Not counting areas where registration increased,
the total number of voters shaved off the registration list amounted
to 240,000.72 For example, there were three municipalities where
the registration list decreased by approximately 46%. On the other
hand, in the four municipalities where voter registration increased,
the PRI won 52% of the vote in 1989, and the percentage of regis-
tered voters increased by 179.39% between 1991 and 1992.
73
G. Identification of Opposition Voters
How does the PRI know how to identify opposition voters?
According to a report by Convergencia, the PRI can count on re-
ceiving all the information obtained by the representatives of the
IFE from the house visits and the voter lists. Additionally, the PRI
puts together its own election list by going block by block and
house by house to detect and note sympathizers in each of the
political parties.74 Prior to the 1991 elections in the State of Chi-
huahua, Convergencia found that the list of PRI sympathizers and
opposition supporters had been compiled in the following manner:
under the pretext of verifying data, the PRI activist parallels the
work of the IFE representatives by visiting the same houses to get
the voters' party preference; in some cases, the PRI visitor actually
substitutes for the IFE representative; and the PRI visitor poses as
a seller of cosmetics and other goods and, through casual conversa-
tion, obtains the information. This work is coordinated by PRI
promotores del voto (vote promoters) or jefes de manzana (block
captains). Each of the PRI's neighborhood section committees
corresponds exactly to electoral sections. The list does not simply
identify party sympathizers but also includes a list of opposition
party preferences and undecided voters. According to Con-
vergencia, the list is computerized and integrated into the IFE's
registered voter computer program, thereby facilitating the process
of "shaving" opposition voters off the registration lists or "losing"
voter registration cards. 75
72. This figure includes voters shaved off the lists in both the 1991 and 1992 pree-
lectoral period.
73. Galarza, supra note 23, at 21.
74. Mireles et al., supra note 69, at 131.
75. Id. at 131-33.
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H. Inflation of the Voter Registration List
Another problem is the inflation of the voter lists with PRI
supporters during the registration process by creating false and du-
plicate vote credentials. In the State of Chihuahua during the 1991
elections, Convergencia found that false credentials were made in
the name of those who were not home for the visit by the IFE
representative and did not go to register, but were known to be
eligible voters.76 Any person living in the home can make up infor-
mation on a person who does not exist, is dead, or exists but does
not live at that address. A birth certificate or an old voter creden-
tial can be used for identification. The person fabricating the false
voter goes to the modulo (a predesignated location) to give finger-
prints and a signature. It is impossible to detect the false creden-
tials at the voting booth because the voter is presenting a facially
valid credential.
In Michoacdn, the PRD mobilized 2,000 people to participate
in checking the voter registration list for dead people, those who
had moved to the United States, or people who simply did not ex-
ist. Their results showed that the number of irregularities in this
category totaled approximately 150,000.7 7
For example, in Pdtzcuaro, one of eighteen electoral districts
in Michoacdn, the PRD reviewed 64 of 134 voter sections and en-
countered 1,740 irregularities-an average of 27.5 per section.78 In
the Ptzcuaro survey, the PRD discovered 689 voters on the electo-
ral list of 115,679 voters who did not exist or did not live at the
indicated address. They discovered 129 people on the list who
were dead, 34 duplicate names, and 52 names of people who did
not receive their credential but appeared on the preliminary voter
registration list. The surveyors also discovered 568 citizens who ap-
peared on the registration list but were actually in the United
States. Additionally, 246 voters had lost their credentials and had
asked for replacements but had not received them, so they could
not vote.79
76. Id. at 124.
77. Beltran del Rio & Castellanos, supra note 37, at 19. Note that the final voter
registration list in Michoacdn had 1,560,979 names.
78. Id.
79. Informe Sobre las Irregularidades del Proceso Electoral en el III Districto Local
de MichoacAn con Cabecera en Pftzcuaro, June 1992 (complaint from PRD representative
on the State Electoral Commission to the State Electoral Commission of MichoacAn)
[hereinafter Complaint].
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In addition to the 150,000 irregularities in the statewide voter
registration list, the PRD claimed that over 100,000 voter creden-
tials were either lost or simply not distributed during the 1992 pree-
lectoral period.s°
I. Distribution of Voter Credentials
The voter must present a valid voter credential at the voting
booth in order to vote. Voter credentials for the July 12, 1992, Mi-
choacin elections were issued up until May 31. Information from
the registration form circulated by representatives of the IFE is
used to make the voter credentials. The credential is brought to
the voter's home by a representative from the IFE. If the voter is
not home, however, he must go to a predesignated location to pick
up the credential.
The same selectivity used in the registration process is also
used in the distribution of voter credentials. For example, repre-
sentatives of the IFE arrive at the homes of opposition voters at
hours when most people are not home. Thus, it is likely that cre-
dentials of opposition voters are not distributed in home visits and,
therefore, must be picked up at the predesignated location. In past
elections, this has resulted in the distribution of fewer credentials
for opposition voters. For example, in a 1991 study in the State of
Chihuahua by Convergencia, it was found that, in sections with
PAN supporters, 47% of the voting credentials were received at
home, as compared to 55.8% for the whole district. Additionally,
in the entire district surveyed (districts are made up of voting sec-
tions), 25.4% of PAN supporters were left without credentials, as
opposed to 18.9% in PRI sections and 19.8% for the whole dis-
trict.81 The PRD states that there are a total of 145,00082 voter
credentials that have not been distributed in Michoacin but that
have been applied for or have been pending since August 1991.
The Federal Electoral Registry ("RFE") asserts that it has distrib-
uted 46,000 of that number and has distributed an additional 40,000
credentials to newly registered voters.8 3
Part of this number is made up of lost voter credentials-the
documents of people who are registered but do not receive or do
80.- Beltran del Rio & Castellanos, supra note 37, at 19.
81. Mireles et al., supra note 69, at 119.
82. This figure covers the preelectoral period of 1991 and 1992.
83. Godfnez, supra note 20, at 5.
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not pick up the credentials at designated locations. The IFE is sup-
posed to publicly destroy credentials that are not claimed. Opposi-
tion parties claim, however, that credentials are intentionally lost
and that, therefore, opposition voters who are registered cannot
vote. For example, in the 1991 elections in Chihuahua, the leader-
ship of the PAN declared that 11,968 credentials were lost, 5,632 of
which corresponded to District IV, an area where they had strong
support.84
In Michoacdn, a study by Julio Santoyo, a representative of
the PRD on the local committee of the RFE, shows that there was
selectivity as to who received credentials in municipalities with
strong PRD support. The two worst examples were in the munici-
pality of Tiquicheo, where the percentage of credentials not re-
ceived represented 20% of the voter registration list, and in Lizaro
Cirdenas, where 15.77% of potential voters could not vote because
they had no credentials. 85
In sum, the PRD estimated that approximately 330,000 people
could not vote in the July 12 election because they either did not
have credentials or were left off the voter registration list.86
J. Verification of the Validity of the Voter Registration List
In Michoacn, great public debate ensued over procedures for
verifying the registration list and the federal control of the process.
The COFIPE establishes the IFE to organize and oversee election
procedures at the federal and state level. The IFE and the RFE
carry out tasks such as the compilation of the voter registration list
and the distribution of voter registration cards.
Article 56 of the State Election Law gives the state the author-
ity to compile its own list independent of the Federal Government
or in collaboration with the IFE.87 In fact, the state allows the Fed-
eral Government to compile the list. Computer fraud and manipu-
lation of the registration list is thus carried out by the IFE, an
organization controlled by the government party, with the support
of local PRI activists.
In the spring of 1991, 256 people were mobilized in Michoacin
to identify irregularities in a voter registration list of 1,560,979 citi-
84. Mireles et al., supra note 69, at 125.
85. Beltran del Rio & Castellanos, supra note 37, at 19.
86. Id.
87. LEY ELECTORAL DEL ESTADO DE MICHOACAN DE OCAMPO art. 56 (Mex.).
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zens. Of the 256 people mobilized, 91 were technicians from the
RFE and 165 represented the six registered political parties. The
representatives of the political parties were observers overseeing
the methodology of the survey. The survey was conducted in 91
municipalities, covering 401 city blocks and 200 (10%) of all the
voting sections. During the survey, 7,605 questionnaires were filled
out with information from 15,653 citizens. As a result of the re-
view, inconsistencies were found in 3.9% of the voter registration
list. The State Electoral Commission then asserted that the voter
registration list was 96.1% accurate.
On July 18, 1992, five of the six political parties represented on
the State Electoral Commission voted to approve the verification
process conducted in the 10% sample study. The PRD voted
against the approval. The PRI argued that the PRD participated in
the review of the electoral lists and that the PRD's political strat-
egy was to delegitimize the organization of the elections by voting
against approval. Subsequently, the PRI used this vote, which fo-
cused only on a sample study, to assert that all the parties except
the PRD believed the registration list was 96.1% accurate. Yet, in
its statements to the press, the PRI manipulated facts about what
had occurred at the State Electoral Commission. The state presi-
dent of the PAN, Luis Mejia Guzmin, described what had actually
occurred at the State Electoral Commission: "What we were asked
to vote on and approve was whether the verification process (sam-
ple study) had been accomplished as designed .... [I]t's very possi-
ble that the 'padron' (list of registered voters) has a much higher
percentage of irregularities than shown by the verification process.
The government wanted to use our vote for other purposes, that's
very clear." 88
The PRD asserted that the study was flawed because the sam-
ple was not representative of the state as a whole-it did not in-
clude rural areas where there are more irregularities. According to
the PRD, there were approximately 150,000 irregularities found in
the registration list, including people who were dead or residing
outside the country. Julio Santoyo, the PRD representative on the
State Electoral Commission, asserted that in the countryside there
are citizens who have no residence, who don't live in the place the
88. Beltran del Rio & Castellanos, supra note 37, at 19 (translation by author).
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election list says they live in, and who plainly don't exist."8 9 Addi-
tionally, in Pitzcuaro, a district of Michoacin with strong PRD
support, 27.5% of the registration list in each voting section was
irregular.9°
An additional problem was that the survey did not include the
number of people who simply did not receive credentials but were
on the registration list. According to the PRD, this is about
104,000 persons. Of the thirty-six municipalities where there are
the highest numbers of people not receiving credentials, seventeen
are PRD-governed and seven are areas where the PRD and the
PRI co-govern. For example, in the city of L~zaro Cirdenas, which
has a PRD mayor, there are 47,852 registered voters, and 7,550
(15.7%) of them did not receive their voter credentials. In the mu-
nicipality of Aquila, there are 6,604 registered voters, and 789 peo-
ple (11.9%) did not receive their voter credentials. 91
These figures show a clear bias by the IFE in the distribution
of voter credentials and the compilation of the voter registration
list. One way to solve the problem is for the states to have more
control over the registration process through establishment of an
independent commission that conducts registration and compiles
its own voter registration list. 2
K. Location of Polling Places
The State Election Law requires that the polling places be lo-
cated no more than two kilometers from population centers to fa-
cilitate easy transportation access. Additionally, the polling places
cannot be located in the homes of party officials.93 The location of
the polling places is published a few days prior to the election in
local newspapers. A frequent problem occurs when polling places
are moved from their predesignated locations. For example, oppo-
sition parties in the 1990 elections in the State of Mexico accused
the Government of making unannounced, last-minute changes in
the locations of as many as 40% of the voting places, creating wide-
89. Josd Urefia, El Pri Hard Campaha en California para Legitimar los Comicios de
Michoacdn, La Jornada, June 24, 1992, at 48 (translation by author).
90. Beltran del Rio & Castellanos, supra note 37, at 19.
91. Urefia, supra note 89, at 48.
92. Beltran del Rio & Castellanos, supra note 37, at 19.
93. LEY ELECrORAL DEL ESTADO DE MICHOACAN DE OCAMPO art. 76 (Mex.).
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spread confusion.94 In Michoacin during the 1992 election, the
PRD claimed that, in District XVI, the authorities completely re-
moved twenty-six polling places that were located in places where
the PRD received the most votes in prior elections. As a result, as
of two weeks before the election, 3,923 citizens in the district were
left without polling places.
95
Additionally, casillas extraordinarias (floating voting booths
that do not have predesignated locations) can be used to inflate the
vote for the government party. According to the State Election
Code, these voting booths cannot have more than 750 listed vot-
ers.96 The State Electoral Commission designates so many floating
voting booths per district, but their location may not be known to
voters, or PRI supporters may know the location but not opposi-
tion party members. Additionally, the booths may be placed only
in locations where the PRI knows they have strong support. By
adding a floating polling place, an additional 750 voting slots be-
come available that can be used for dead people, fictitious people,
and those residing elsewhere, for example, in other states or in the
United States. Another problem is that when the location of the
floating polling place is published in local newspapers just a few
days before the election, a voter on the registration list of that
booth may not know where he or she should vote because he or
she assumes voting will take place in the regular neighborhood vot-
ing location and he or she is not familiar with the newly announced
"floating" location.
According to the PRD, there were irregularities in 5.5% of the
polling places listed in local newspapers by the State Electoral
Commission. The irregularities were caused by changes in the lo-
cations, substitutions of functionaries, and omissions or additions
of polling places. 97
L. Who Runs the Polling Place
There were 3,400 polling places in the 1992 Michoacin elec-
tion. The state electoral law establishes what is in theory a fair and
impartial process for determining who runs each polling place and
94. Mark A. Uhlig, One Clear Result of Mexican Vote: Fraud Changes, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 1990, at A9.
95. Urefia, supra note 89, at 48.
96. LEY ELECrORAL DEL ESTADO DE MICHOACAN DE OCAMPO art. 129 (Mex.).
97. Pascal Beltran del Rio & Francisco Castellanos, Compas de Espera entre Villase-
for y Arias; el PRI no logro su objectivo de arrolar al PRD, PRoCESo, July 21, 1992, at 8.
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who counts the votes.98 Yet, party affiliation and partiality of those
who run the polling places have been reoccurring issues in prior
elections. The functionaries at the polling places are supposed to
prevent fraud and receive complaints about fraud. They have the
authority to sign complaints regarding irregularities, thereby facili-
tating the annulment of election returns in individual polling
places. 99
Each polling place has a president, a secretary, and two vote-
counters. Additionally, each of the political parties may name a
representative of their party to be present in the polling place to
monitor the integrity of the process.
Article 73 of the State Election Law requires that the presi-
dent and the secretary of the polling place be chosen by lottery
from the registration list of each voting section.100 Twenty percent
of the citizens in each voting section are to be randomly picked
from the voter registration list for these posts. The vote counters
are taken from lists proposed by the political parties. The potential
presidents and secretaries are then given training and an objective
test by instructors named by the District Electoral Committees to
. determine who is actually capable of fulfilling the positions.
The problem with this selection procedure is that PRI activists
end up being the functionaries in disproportionate numbers.
Moreover, they are often the same people who have run the pol-
ling place in prior years. For example, in 1991 elections in Chihua-
hua, in one voting section, 80% of those chosen to be secretaries
and presidents of the polling places were secretaries and presidents
of the polling places in the prior election. Because there is only a
20% possibility of being chosen to be in the pool, an 80% repeti-
tion rate was statistically impossible, especially in voting sections
with high numbers of registered PAN voters.
In a study of this phenomenon in the 1992 Michoacdn elec-
tions by Convergencia, it was found that, in District III (Pdtzcuaro),
122 out of 157 (77%) of the presidents of the polling places and 107
out of 157 (68%) of the secretaries were active members of the
PRI-a statistical impossibility considering that, in the 1991 elec-
tions, by official count, 52.67% of the voters in District III were
opposition party voters and that, in the July 12, 1992, election, op-
98. LEY ELECTORAL DEL ESTADO DE MICHOACAN DE OcAMPo arts. 72-81 (Mex.).
99. Id.
100. Id art. 73.
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position parties received 21,171 votes as compared to the PRI's
19,044 votes. Additionally, 100% of those who administered the
selection and the testing of the randomly-selected citizens were
members of the PRI.
A leader of the PAN in Uruapan found another irregularity.
In one voting section (a voting section has 750 to 1,500 voters), the
list of vote-counters proposed by the Party of the Cardenist Front
for National Reconstruction ("PFCRN") (a satellite party of the
PRI) corresponded exactly to that proposed by the PRI. In this
way, the PRI increased the probabilities that its activists would be
chosen. 01
In a formal complaint filed by the PRD before the State Elec-
toral Commission on June 30, 1992, the PRD's representative on
the Commission, Leoncio Ferrerfa Sdnchez, submitted a document
with evidence of disproportionate repetition of the presidents and
the secretaries of the polling places. 102 The complaint demon-
strated the partiality of the State Electoral Commission's process
for selecting the presidents and the secretaries.
VI. ELECION-DAY FRAuD
Fraud on election day takes many forms. For example, in past
elections, opposition voters who have official voter credentials in
hand have been denied the right to vote when their names could
not be found on the voter registration lists, while members of the
PRI have been allowed to vote without voter credentials or with
false voter credentials. False credentials are difficult to detect un-
less observers inside the poll know that the person voting is not the
person who appears on the registration list.
In Chihuahua during the 1988 elections, the observers in one
voting district found thirteen polls with voters from other districts.
They arrived at the poll in taxis.' 03 These voters are called "flying
brigades"-people going from polling place to polling place to vote
repeatedly. This is made possible through the issuance of multiple
voting cards. Premarked ballots have also been stuffed inside
101. Pascal Beltran del Rio & Francisco Castellanos, Las Elecciones en Michoacdn En-
camindas Ineludiblemente Hacia el Conflicto, PROCEso, July 13, 1992, at 19.
102. Recurso de Apelaci6n del PRD ante el Tribunal Estatal Electoral de Michoacdn
sobre la Illegalidad en la Integraci6n de las Mesas Directivas de Casilla y el Numero y
Ubicaci6n de Casillas, June 30, 1992 (PRD appeal before the State Electoral Commission
regarding illegal activities at polling sites).
103. Andrew Reding, Mexico at a Crossroads, 5 WoRLD POL'Y J. 615, 623 (1988).
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other ballots (called "tacos"). Moreover, in the 1988 Chihuahua
elections, ballot boxes were found to contain marked ballots
("pregnant boxes") before the first vote was cast. 104
In the days preceding the Presidential elections of 1988, bal-
lots already marked in favor of the PRI were distributed to govern-
ment employees and union members in what is called the
"carousel." Voters were expected to substitute their marked bal-
lots for the clean ballots they are given at the polling location, then
return the clean ballots to their bosses for recycling.105
In districts unfavorable to the PRI, voters have also been
turned away when the supply of ballots ran out. For example, in
the July 12, 1992, Michoacin elections, the electoral commissioners
of the PAN and the PRD in District VI, headquartered in
Uruapan, denounced the disappearance of more than 5,000 ballots
from the local electoral committee. The commissioners com-
plained that 2,137 ballots were missing for Governor and 3,337 for
deputy. These were counted and sent from the capital but never
arrived in Uruapan. Of the 5,474 ballots, 3,310 corresponded to
the municipality of Ziracuaretiro, one of the twenty-five municipal-
ities in which the PRI had lost to the PRD in the last four elections
and where, in the past federal election, the PRD had a 300 vote
advantage over the PRI.1°6
On election day, Convergencia conducted its observations at
the polling places with a detailed questionnaire. The following is a
sample of the irregularities and violations of the State Election
Law identified by national observers from Convergencia: in four-
teen polling places, there was no voter registration list (Article
123); in eighteen polling places, indelible ink was not used to mark
thumbs, so that a voter could conceivably vote more than once
(Article 123); in sixty-four polling places, there were more ballots
than the number of voters on the list, allowing for the possible
marking of additional ballots (Article 123); in seventy-eight polling
places, there were fewer ballots than the number of voters on the
list, thus preventing some people from voting (Article 123); in
sixty-seven polling places, people were permitted to vote without
showing their voting credential (Article 128); in 174 polling places,
political party identification rather than the voting credential was
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Beltran del Rio & Castellanos, supra note 97, at 16.
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accepted, increasing the likelihood that the person voting was not
the registered voter (Article 128);107 in sixty-three polling places,
people were not able to vote secretly (Article 133); in sixty-nine
polling places, there was coerced voting (Article 135);108 in four-
teen polling places, representatives of the political parties were not
allowed to be present and, thus, were unable to ensure that the
procedures were in conformity with the law (Article 118); in ten
polling places, written complaints regarding the voting process
were not accepted (Article 138); and in sixty-five polling places,
284 citizens with voting credentials in hand did not appear on the
voter registration list and thus were not allowed to vote. 1° 9
On election day, our group from the United States" 0 divided
up into four teams and visited communities surrounding Los
Reyes, Pdtzcuaro, and Uruapan. In the city of Morelia, we visited
polling places in Morelia Norte. Three of the four groups asked a
set of questions from an interview form developed by members of
the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government. In order to
respect the concern voiced by the Government that the presence of
foreign observers constituted interference with the national elec-
tion process, our group did not interview citizens leaving and enter-
ing the polling places. Rather, we interviewed the national
observers as they conducted their own observations at the polling
places. While interviewing the observers and watching the pro-
107. Article 134 requires that the voting credential be perforated with a card punch to
prevent multiple voting. LEY ELECTORAL DEL ESTADO DE MICHOACAN DE OCAMPO art.
134 (Mex.).
108. In 18 of those polling places, the person responsible for the act was a member of
the governing body of the polling place.
109. Convergencia Michoacana y Convergencia. Nacional de Organismos Civiles Por
La Democracia, Informe Preliminar de la Jornada Electoral del 12 de Julio de 1992 en
Michoacan 1-4 (July 13, 1992).
110. Members of the delegation: Cynthia Anderson-Barker, Loyola Law School '93,
Executive Committee, National Lawyers Guild-Los Angeles Chapter; Robert Benson, Pro-
fessor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; Tony Bracamonte, Dean, South Mountain
Community College, Southwest Voters Research Institute; Jose Carranza, UCLA student
in Latin American and Chicano Studies; Craig Cardon, Loyola Law School '93; Arnoldo
Garcia, Resource Coordinator for the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee
Rights; Jin Sook Lee, Young Koreans United; Wally Marks, businessman, Liberty Hill
Foundation board member; Ellen Melinkoff, writer, Humanitarian Law Project board
member; Charles Rappleye, writer, biographer; Dr. Gloria Romero, Professor of Psychol-
ogy, California State University, Los Angeles; Nancy Sanchez, staff attorney, Los Angeles
Catholic Charities; Claude Steiner, writer, psychologist. Organizations are listed for identi-
fication purposes only.
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ceedings from outside the polling places, members of our group
also directly observed some irregularities in the voting process.
The following is a brief summary of information gathered and
events witnessed on election day.
A. Pdtzcuaro, Tzintzuntzan, and Santa Fe
Complaints were made that the location of polling places had
been changed at the last minute, creating widespread confusion. In
Pitzcuaro, we discovered that numerous polling places had been
moved from their published locations. For example, two days prior
to the election, one polling place was moved from a school where it
had been located for thirty years to the home of a PRI activist.
Two polling places were actually located in this home. Under the
State Election Law, polling places cannot be located in the homes
of party officials and activists.11'
In all three areas, the national observers reported incidents of
people voting without credentials and with expired credentials.
National observers also reported that people were voting who were
not on the voter registration list. At many of these same locations,
voter credentials were not punched, thus allowing for the possibil-
ity of voting a second time. One of the functionaries of the polling
place, the president, responded that there was no time to punch all
the credentials.
In Santa Fe, a small community with four polling places, the
national observer informed us that many people were sent to a dif-
ferent town eight kilometers away when they arrived to vote at
their polling place. State Election Law requires that the polling
places be located no more than two kilometers from population
centers.112
In Tzintzuntzan, the secretary of a polling place allowed three
to five young men to loiter all day within five to ten feet of the
table for marking ballots, compromising the secrecy of the vote.
This is a clear violation of the election law." 3 Additionally, people
arriving from different towns were allowed to vote over the protest
of party representatives.
In Pdtzcuaro, intimidation by the presence of the army was a
problem. Two days before the election, the army conducted ma-
111. LEY ELECTORAL DEL ESTADO DE MICHOACAN DE OCAMPO art. 76 (Mex.).
112. Id. art. 93.
113. Id. art. 137.
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neuvers in the streets. In Huecario and Uaracuaro, state police
went to three polling places and asked the functionaries of the pol-
ling place to give their names.
At one polling place, we saw a Suburban (jeep) arriving with
PRI stickers on the back. A PRI federal deputy emerged with four
other men. They entered the polling place and photographed eve-
ryone present. They also photographed the license plates of all the
cars in the vicinity. When the ballot-count began at this polling
place, the representatives of the PAN and the PRD were expelled
from their rightful location inside the polling place and the doors
were shut. This violates Articles 26(e) and 141 of the State Elec-
tion Law, which allow party representatives to be present during
the ballot-count.114
Elsewhere in Pttzcuaro, we were informed by the national ob-
servers that people with press credentials lacking affiliation with
any newspaper or other media were videotaping the proceedings
inside the polling places. These individuals were commonly be-
lieved to be members of the PRI or state security.
In Los Reyes, there also was a strong presence of the military
and police. We saw three truckloads of police pull up and approxi-
mately twenty uniformed officers walk about the town on election
day.
B. Morelia Norte
In Morelia Norte, we visited seven polling places. In one pol-
ling place, the indelible ink used to identify multiple voters was not
used, so that a person was allowed to vote whose thumb had al-
ready been inked at another polling place; police officers bearing
arms were allowed in the polling place; and one large group of peo-
ple arrived to vote at the same time.115 Additionally, at this polling
place, the number of ballots counted did not coincide with the
number of people who actually voted.
At another polling place, there were no official party repre-
sentatives present. This polling place had the greatest number of
election law violations. Thus, the presence of party representatives
in the polling place seems critical for ensuring fair election prac-
tices. At this location, voters were pressured to vote for the PRI; a
114. See id. arts. 26(e), 141.
115. While this is not a violation of the electoral law, it indicates that people may be
going from polling place to polling place, voting repeatedly.
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group of voters arrived in taxis; PRI propaganda (hats, shirts, etc.)
were allowed in the polling place; four people were allowed to vote
whose names were not on the registration list; two people were
allowed to vote without showing a voter credential; and five people
did not have their thumbs inked.
In another polling place, five people were allowed to vote
without showing a credential, and the PRI representatives were in-
structing people as to where to mark their ballots. In another loca-
tion, we witnessed an altercation between a party representative
and the president of the polling place. A woman came to vote who
could not read or write. She asked for instructions on how to vote,
and the president told her to mark the box for the PRI. The PRD
representative objected and said that the vote should be annulled.
Additionally, at this polling place, there was a false threat of a gas
explosion the evening before the election, and this apparently
caused a low voter turnout. At another polling place, a man was
permitted to vote for the Governor twice. At another location,
eleven people came to vote and each had voter credentials; how-
ever, they were not on the registration list. Five of these individu-
als were members of the PRD and claimed they had been
deliberately left off the list. Two of the seven polling places sur-
veyed ran out of ballots, and thus, approximately fifteen people
were not able to vote.
C. Uruapan
In Uruapan, our team visited ten polling places. Two polling
places had no registration lists, and the locations of these polling
places were not known to voters until the day of the election. Half
of the polling places surveyed did not use any ink to prevent multi-
ple voting. There was an altercation at one polling place when it
was discovered that the president of the polling place, a member of
the PRI, was the son of a man who was president in four prior
elections.116 In some polling places, the president and the secretary
were the same as those in the prior election, a statistical improba-
bility. In another polling place, the PAN party representative re-
quested that indelible ink be used, but his offer was rejected by the
president of the polling place.
116. The State Election Law requires that the president and the secretary be chosen
from a random pool of 20% of the registration list in a section. LEY ELECrORAL DEL
ESTADo DE MICHOACAN DE OcAMPo art. 73 (Mex.).
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Convergencia released a report summarizing the data from
their national election observation teams covering 200 polling
places. The national observers reported forty-four different viola-
tions of the State Election Law and an average of 8.4 generic types
of violations in each polling place.1 17 The irregularites we observed
were serious. While not numerous, we may have been able to see
just the tip of the iceberg. Nonetheless, the instances of fraud we
did see reflect an attitude of manipulation-labyrinthine schemes
devised to obtain votes fraudulently.
VII. POST-ELECTION MANIPULATIONS
Votes are counted at the polling places in the presence of the
functionaries, which include one representative from each of the
opposition parties. One copy of the election results is posted at the
polling place, another is given to each of the party representatives,
and the original is sent to a regional center, which receives and
tallies the returns from other polling places. One way to verify the
validity of the officially-published returns is by summing up the
numbers on copies of official tally sheets from individual polling
locations or from those copies in the possession of the different
political parties. One problem is that the posted results and those
in the possession of the party representatives often differ from the
official results released by the State Electoral Commission. For ex-
ample, in August 1991, Vincente Fox Quezada, PAN party candi-
date for Governor in Guanajuato, filed a complaint with state
election officials, charging that, in 500 out of 3,600 polling places,
there were more votes recorded than voters who turned out to cast
ballots.11 8
After the election in Michoacdn, Samuel del Villar, the PRD's
lawyer and Secretary of Planning, stated that his party had copies
of the official voting results of 90% of the polling places. The PRD
was missing about 350 official tally sheets because the PRD repre-
sentatives had been expelled from the polling places and could not
obtain them. Del Villar estimated that 30% of the polling place
results should be annulled because of irregularities occurring at the
polling places on election day.11 9 The PRD requested that the bal-
117. Beltran del Rio & Castellanos, supra note 97, at 8.
118. Marjorie Miller, Victor in Mexico Vote Resigns Amid Charges of Fraud, L.A.
Timas, Aug. 30, 1991, at A28.
119. Beltran del Rio & Castellanos, supra note 97, at 9.
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lot boxes be opened publicly and votes recounted in questionable
cases. The president of the PRI, Genaro Borrego, initially agreed
to arrange for a public recount to compare the vote tally sheets
gathered separately by the PRD and the PRI functionaries in the
polling place. He later refused, however, perhaps because the re-
sults would not have been favorable to the PRI.
When asked if copies of tally sheets held by other opposition
parties were not sufficient assurance against fraud, Del Villar
stated that the other satellite and opposition parties frequently side
with the PRI in return for postelection favors. Thus, above and
beyond all the other problems with the electoral process, the sys-
tem suffers from a fatal flaw, which by itself prevents any electoral
system from possessing legitimacy: there is no fool-proof system in
place to assure the integrity of the official vote count.
VIII. Procedures for Election Complaints
There are numerous levels of review for complaints of electo-
ral irregularities and fraud. Complaints regarding fraud on elec-
tion day are either taken to or made by the functionaries of the
polling place. The complaint is then submitted to the District Elec-
toral Committee, the State Electoral Commission, and the State
Electoral Tribunal.120
There are eighteen District Electoral Committees in the State
of Michoacin. Opposition groups and independent non-govern-
mental citizens organizations charge that members of the District
Committees operate arbitrarily and do not prepare studies or ana-
lyze adequately complaints submitted by opposition parties.
Prior to the election and publication of the "definitive" voter
registration list, the six registered political parties in Michoacin
had the opportunity to submit written complaints regarding irregu-
larities in the registration list to the State Electoral Commission
during what is called the "purification period." Upon receiving
complaints during the purification period, the Commission must in-
vestigate and correct irregularities. Some changes were made in
the voter registration list, the location of polling places, and the
designation of functionaries as a result of complaints submitted by
opposition parties.
120. See LEY ELECTORAL DEL EsTADO DE MICHOACAN DE OcAMPo arts. 187-94
(Mex.).
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One problem with the complaint process is that the State Elec-
toral Commission itself is not impartial. Rather, it is dominated by
the PRI and its satellite parties. The president of the State Electo-
ral Commission and the six "impartial" citizen members are picked
by the Governor. The six registered political parties represented
on the Commission choose their own representatives. The political
parties, with the exception of the PRD and sometimes the PAN,
generally vote with the PRI-affiliated majority. Thus, the Commis-
sion may not act on complaints using procedural excuses or may
simply ignore the irregularities. It should be noted that the State
Electoral Commission's own survey results of the voter registration
list showed 96.1% accuracy in the list. As mentioned earlier, these
results were contested by the PRD in an independent survey.121
If no action is taken on a valid complaint, an appeal may be
made to the State Electoral Tribunal, which is composed of three
magistrates and three jurors. The partiality of the Tribunal is an
issue because members of the Tribunal are appointed by the State
congress at the suggestion of the State Governor. This tribunal was
established because there is no constitutional provision for review
of electoral issues in the federal or state court systems.
Remedies for violations of voting procedures on election day
are covered in Articles 185 and 186 of the State Election Law.122 If
a representative of one of the political parties sees a voting irregu-
larity, he or she must put the complaint in writing, and that com-
plaint must be accepted by the officials of the polling place to be
included in the acta (official document noting votes counted and
events occurring at the polling place).
Complainants have difficulty proving election fraud. Accord-
ing to Article 193, in order for a complaint regarding voting irregu-
larities to be valid, it must be included in the acta (the designated
officials of the polling place may be reluctant to do this) or wit-
nessed by a notary, a judge, or a public official.123 Oral testimony
or written testimony by non-official witnesses is not accepted. Yet,
it is often difficult to get a complaint notarized because the notaries
are generally members of the PRI and are unwilling to witness and
acknowledge that voting irregularities have occurred.
121. See supra part V.J.
122. LEY ELECTORAL DEL ESTADO DE MICHOACAN DE OCAMPO arts. 185-86 (Mex.).
123. Id. art. 193.
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The notarized complaint must be presented to the functiona-
ries of the polling place or to the District Electoral Committee
within three days after the vote-count at the polling place. In cases
where the complaint contests the tabulation of votes, the complaint
must be presented within forty-eight hours. The District Electoral
Committee must then present the complaint to the State Electoral
Tribunal and the other political parties within forty-eight hours.
The Tribunal may issue a finding before the installation of the Elec-
toral College, or it may simply not respond to the complaint.
When acting on complaints, the Tribunal has the authority to sub-
stantiate appeals and complaints regarding electoral irregularities.
The Tribunal can recommend that the Electoral College confirm
the results of the polling place, nullify all the votes from one or
more polling places, or change the vote computation based on the
irregularities. 124
According to Article 185 of the State Election Law, the results
of an entire polling place can be nullified when there are gross ir-
regularities, such as allowing people to vote without credentials, or
when physical violence or the bribing of functionaries significantly
alters the results.125 According to Article 186 of the State Election
Law, results of an entire election can be nullified when irregulari-
ties are found in 50% of the polling places. 126 Independent citi-
zens' groups have argued that the standard is too stringent-the
state should adopt the provision in the Federal Code, which allows
for the nullification of results when irregularities are found in 20%
of the polling places.127
The Electoral Tribunal cannot make any definitive decisions
about the results of elections. Only the State Electoral College has
the legal authority to nullify the results of an entire election. The
MCD and the ACUDE charge that the Tribunal is simply a buffer,
or a cushion, to help complainants feel that there is a system of
redress and review for election irregularities; the tribunal has no
real authority. These groups feel that the complaint process simply
drains the resources of those making claims. 128
The State Electoral College has the final authority to nullify or
approve the results of the election. Electoral College members can
124. Id. art. 204.
125. Id. art. 185.
126. Id. art. 186.
127. C.O.F.I.P.E. art. 288 (Mex.).
128. Dictamen, supra note 31, at 9.
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challenge the results from individual polling places, seek to annul
entire districts, or dispute the victory of declared winners. None-
theless, the Electoral College has been criticized for simply being a
rubber stamp for all election results. The Electoral College is
made up of deputies in the State congress. In a state election, these
deputies are installed before the Electoral College meets. Thus,
the persons entering office by fraud may be the same individuals
ratifying the results of their own contested election. Provisional
approval of election results by the State Electoral College in Mi-
choacin took place on August 16 to 19, 1992, and final ratification
of election results occurred on December 23, 1992.
IX. AFTERMATH
The PRI's hope to win the election by an overwhelming
720,000 votes in order to moot the charges of fraud did not work.
According to the official figures of the State Electoral Commission,
the PRI received 418,080 (52.7%) of the vote for Governor, while
the PRD received 289,724 (36.5%) of the vote. 129 The PRI offi-
cially won by only 16 percentage points. The PRD maintains that
the actual vote was 202,570 votes (50%) for the PRD, 179,396
votes (44%) for the PRI, and 22,570 votes (6%) for the PAN. 130
The PRD's figures reflect votes that should have been annulled
due to irregularities detected on election day. It should also be
noted that, according to PRD estimates, 240,000 voters were
shaved off the registration list, 106,007 credentials were either lost
or not distributed, and approximately 150,000 dead or nonexistent
people were on the final voter registration list.13 1 The official mar-
gin of victory was narrow enough that widespread political protest
after the election forced President Salinas to replace the "elected"
PRI candidate Villasefior with Ausencio ChAvez, former PRI Sec-
retary of the Interior in charge of political affairs, elections, and the
federal police. Until it was announced in mid-October that Villase-
fior would resign, thousands of people participated in protests
throughout the state and in the capital. The day after the July 12
election, more than 10,000 people assembled in the town square in
Morelia for a victory celebration for the PRD candidate Arias.
Hundreds of protesters remained in the town square, blockading
129. Beltran del Rio & Castellanos, supra note 97, at 8.
130. VeIzquez, supra note 27, at 3-4.
131. Beltran del Rio & Castellanos, supra note 37, at 19.
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the entrances to the Governor's office and preventing Villasefior
from entering the state office building until the day Villasefior's
resignation was announced. Chdvez, the new temporary Governor,
became known as the "Iron-hand" after he ordered the forced
eviction in December 1991 of PRD activists who had seized fifty-
two town halls to demand recognition of their victories in local
elections. Since the July 12 election, twenty-one people have died
in Michoacin in political conflicts over the election.
X. CONCLUSION: ELECTORAL REFORM
Despite minor reforms instituted by the Government since
1963, the government party still controls the election process and
the mechanisms by which the laws are monitored and enforced. At
the national level, a bicameral Congress consists of a sixty-four-
member Senate directly elected for six years, and a 500 member
Chamber of Deputies elected for three years-300 by direct vote
and 200 through a system of proportional representation. A 1986
reform added 100 seats to the Chamber of Deputies on the basis of
proportional representation to give the smaller parties a chance for
a seat in the Federal Congress. The political power of these parties
is diluted, however, by the "governability clause," which guaran-
tees the PRI control of the majority of Congressional seats even
when it wins less than half of the direct votes for those seats.
Therefore, it is difficult to reform the election laws unless the PRI
decides it will support such changes. Furthermore, under a 1989
"reform," parties are prohibited from voting for a Presidential can-
didate whose slates of deputies are not from the same party. This
"reform" was a direct response to the threat posed by FDN, a coa-
lition formed of opposition groups and political parties in 1988
under the leadership of CuauhtAmoc Cdrdenas. 132
The State Election Law of Michoactin was modified in 1991 to
reflect 1989 reforms made in the COFIPE. Article 49 of the State
Election Law requires that the State Electoral Commission have
equal representation by all the registered political parties. 133 Each
of the parties has one vote on the Commission, and a majority vote
is required for approval of major decisions. There are five in-
dependent citizen members of the Commission, in addition to the
six representatives of the political parties. The executive branch
132. BARRY, supra note 5, at 31.
133. LEY ELECTORAL DEL ESTADO DE MICHOACAN DE OCAMPO art. 49 (Mex.).
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(controlled by the PRI) and the legislature (dominated by the
PRI), however, select the non-political party members and the
president of the Commission. In actuality, the executive branch
has the final say in the composition of the Electoral Commission. 34
As a result of the biased nature of the Commission, the PRD gen-
erally found itself outvoted. In Michoacin, the satellite parties of
the PRI, the PAN, and the citizen members of the Commission
generally voted with the PRI majority.
Jos6 Agustin Ortfz Pinchetti, lawyer, journalist and member of
the MCD, notes that a major antidemocratic feature of the State
Election Law is the provision providing for nullification of an elec-
tion only when irregularities are found in 50% of the polling
places. 135 As noted earlier, the federal law and the election laws of
many states provide that an election can be annulled when irregu-
larities are found in just 20% of the polling places. 136
Another issue is state acquiescence of federal control over
state elections through the IFE's organization and validation of
election procedures. Control and oversight over the compilation of
the voter registration list was taken away from the Federal Govern-
ment by the State legislatures in Baja California and, most re-
cently, in Chihuahua during its 1992 gubernatorial elections. This
had a significant impact on the outcome of elections in these two
states.
Prior to PAN's 1992 victory of the Governorship in the State
of Chihuahua, Baja California was the only state that did not have
a PRI Governor. In 1989, amid charges of fraud, President Salinas
reluctantly conceded that Ernesto Ruffo Appel of the PAN won
the Governorship in Baja California.137 Subsequently, Ruffo won
federal approval of a plan whereby the state, not the Federal Elec-
tion Commission, controlled the compilation of the voter registra-
tion list for the 1992 elections. The federal registration list was
then audited, and the state auditors found 150,000 voters in Baja
California without known addresses. In just one example of the
134. Dictamen, supra note 31, at 9.
135. Teresa Gurza, LA JORNADA, June 30, 1992, at 15 (untitled article).
136. C.O.F.I.P.E. art. 288 (Mex.).
137. Lucy Conger, Opposition Wins Mexican State Governorship, FIN. TIMES, July 6,
1989, at 6.
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gross irregularities, a Mexicali woman was discovered in possession
of sixteen federal voter credentials.
138
Additionally, Baja California has a new high-tech voter regis-
tration and identification system aimed at eliminating fraud
through repeat voting and the inflation of lists with fictitious and
dead voters. There is a photo on the voter credential and a com-
puterized registry of the photos, fingerprints, and signatures on the
voter identification card. The identification card also has a laser
printed hologram that serves as a security seal. Finally, to ensure
maximum voter participation in Baja California, the PAN doubled
the amount of time previously allotted for voter registration, ex-
tending the deadline from March to mid-May. In contrast, in Mi-
choac6n, the time allotted for voter registration during the 1992
elections was from April 1 to April 30.139
Electoral reform had an impact on the 1992 elections in Chi-
huahua. In December 1991, the State congress in Chihuahua unan-
imously approved a new advance in the electoral law that
incorporated numerous proposals by the PAN opposition. The
state partially funded an independent six-month audit of the elec-
toral lists by technical experts from the PAN. The voter registra-
tion lists were analyzed, and the documents made during the initial
home interviews were reviewed. Most of the detected irregulari-
ties were then incorporated into the RFE list. The State Electoral
Commission dominated by the PRI agreed to these changes and, as
a result of changes made in the voter registration list, half of the
functionaries of the polling places ended up being PRI, the other
half PAN. The location of the polling places, an issue in prior elec-
tions, was determined from proposals taken from each of the mu-
nicipal committees of the political parties. All the ballots and
materials used in the polling places were guarded by the represent-
atives of the political parties and a notary. A new high-tech indeli-
ble ink was used uniformly in all the polling places.140 Finally, on
July 13, there was an agreement to distribute voter credentials over
138. Sebastian Rotella, Baja's Hex on Voter Black Magic, L.A. TIMEs (San Diego
County Edition), Jan. 3, 1992, at Bi.
139. Calendario del Proceso Electoral en el Estado de Michoacdn, supra note 68.
140. Jos6 Augustfn Ortfz Pinchetti, En Chihuahua, Barrio Vuelve a Provocar Pasi6n,
Mientras Promueve las Elecciones Mas Technicamente Confiables, PROCESO, June 29, 1992,
at 14.
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a ten-day period to the 65,000 people of Chihuahua who appeared
on the voter registration list but had not received credentials.
141
Reforms were made in election procedures in Chihuahua prior
to the 1992 elections because the State legislature was responsive
to PAN reform proposals. Yet, the PRI argues that significant re-
forms had already been made at the state and federal level, such as
the creation of the IFE to organize and validate election proce-
dures, the use of indelible ink to mark voters to ensure they do not
vote twice, the use of translucent ballot boxes to prevent ballot-
stuffing, the closure of voter registration well before the elections
to allow the lists to be scrutinized, and the presence of opposition
party members at polling places to monitor voting procedures. Ad-
ditionally, the Federal Congress has authorized a new photo identi-
fied federal election credential to be used in the 1994 Presidential
elections.
It should be noted, however, that the closure of voter registra-
tion a few months prior to an election does not ensure independent
review of the voter registration list. The integrity of the Govern-
ment audit is questionable; thus, the political parties need sufficient
time to conduct their own independent audit. Convergencia rec-
ommends that the final voting list be given to the political parties
for review at least two months before the election.142 This would
give the parties time to make house visits, check for duplicate
names, verify that the deceased do not appear on the list, etc. In
Michoac~n, the voter registration list was distributed to the polit-
ical parties for review on June 17, and the final list was published
on June 23, leaving only six days for the submission of complaints
and revisions to the State Electoral Commission.
Twelve days before voters went to the polls in the July 12 Mi-
choacin elections, the MCD and the ACUDE released a report
stating that conditions did not exist for fair elections in Michoacin.
Addressing preelection issues, the two groups proposed the follow-
ing reforms: (1) public disclosure of the amount and source of re-
sources used in the campaigns; (2) public disclosure of the
biographies of the functionaries of the polling places; (3) cessation
of the PRI's campaign of defamation in the press against the two
major opposition parties; (4) access to the media by the opposition
141. Jorge Fernandez Men6ndez, Chihuahua y Michoacdn: Cinco Diferencias, NExos,
July 1992, at 59.
142. NuEsmRA PALABRA, supra note 20, at 155.
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parties during the hours of greatest audience viewing; (5) a debate
between the three candidates, to be transmitted by radio and tele-
vision; 143 (6) a prohibition on state and federal government em-
ployees working in the PRI campaign; and (7) removal of a
military presence on election day. "The presence of the military
only serves to terrorize the people and as a result they do not go to
vote."144
Looking ahead to the 1994 national elections, the PRD will be
presenting amendments to the COFIPE in the Federal Chamber of
Deputies. These proposals include: (1) more television and radio
time for opposition parties; (2) limits on campaign spending by all
political parties; (3) independent revision of the voter registration
list; (4) an expanded role for the IFE so that the IFE can establish
limits on campaign spending and monitor the spending; (5) a new
mechanism for designating the president and the secretary of the
IFE;145 and (6) an expanded role for the Viligance Commissions of
the Federal Election Registry so that the Commission can receive
and resolve complaints against IFE employees for acts or omissions
that affect the integrity and confidentiality of the electoral list.
143. There were no face-to-face debates between the gubernatorial candidates during
the campaign.
144. Gurza, supra note 135 (translation by author).
145. Currently, the president is the PRI Secretary of Government (equivalent to the
Minister of Interior).
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